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to the increasingly prevalent belief that normative moral judgments are matters simply of personal preference. The problem
of moral skepticism, however, runs deep and wide in American
culture; it is hardly unique to constitutional theory. For us to
move beyond the impasse of contemporary constitutional theory,
we must confront the moral predicament of American society in
general. We must address the existence and meaning of moral
truth in the radically pluralistic, and increasingly polarized, society in which we live. A daunting challenge, to say the least.

THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE. By Howard Gillman.t Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 317. $29.95.

Herbert Hovenkampz
Gillman's book is another in a long and growing list of titles
written in the 1980s and early 1990s designed to illuminate the
Lochner era in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Gillman is interested mainly in antecedents, beginning with the Founders and focusing heavily on the Jackson period. Like most good recent
writing on this subject, Gillman eschews the use of legal "formalism" as an explanatory paradigm. That notion, that the judges
were rule-bound lawyers who separated law from policy, explains
little and is, in any event, wrong. Substantive due process was
driven by policy concerns just as much as landmark twentiethcentury decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education or Roe v.
Wade, and the judges who espoused it were a highly creative and
energetic group.
Gillman argues that although substantive due process was
formalized in American constitutional thought in the 1880s and
after, its presence is detectable much earlier than historians have
generally realized. Indeed, one can find it as early as the late
eighteenth century, and it becomes quite visible already in the
second decade of the nineteenth century. As he notes, the great
revolution in ideas of free trade that facilitated the rise of the
Jacksonian movement and an incipient national market created a
corresponding hostility toward parochial state and local regulations that tended to favor hometown businesses at the expense of
1. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California.
2. Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
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others, or to impose unreasonable burdens on those engaged in
various enterprises. The result was that already in the 1810s and
1820s numerous courts began to read "reasonableness" requirements into regulatory provisions that, on their face, seemed to
state absolute prohibitions. For example, in 1828, in Vadine's
Case,3 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a
law preventing unlicensed persons from removing waste materials or other filth from dwelling houses must be read to prevent
them only if they acted unreasonably in the process.
The essentially Jacksonian origins of Gilded Age substantive
due process has been known for some time. For example, those
who have studied the work of Thomas M. Cooley, whose treatise
on Constitutional Limitations (1868)4 became a manifesto for
Lochner jurisprudence, have often noted his strongly Jacksonian
commitments. But on this point Gillman goes even earlier, tracing the origins of substantive due process to the Jackson era's
market revolution itself.
As Gillman notes, Marshall era "vested rights" jurisprudence, which used the Contract Clause as the most aggressive
protector of liberties, took a serious beating during the Jackson
era. Indeed, conservatives viewed such Jacksonian decisions as
the Charles River Bridge case (1837)5 as emasculating the contract clause. Of course, this was done with good reason: those
who could claim "vestedness" as the source of their rights were
invariably the privileged who had acquired promises from the
sovereign to begin with. Rhetorically, at least, the Jackson movement represented the triumph of those who sought to undermine
the concept of privilege.
But the failure of vestedness mandated the substitution of a
different source for political liberties-and, in this case, one that
was more general, in that it did not depend on the state's former
largesse. One problem with the vested rights doctrine was that
the only persons who could claim it were those who had a vested
right to begin with. The Jacksonian concept of individual rights
was much more universal, to be asserted without regard to earlier grants of largesse from the sovereign. Unfortunately, there
was not very much in the pre-Civil War Constitution from which
such rights could be inferred. Judges began to find it, Gillman
argues, in "an aversion to factional or class politics." That is to
say, substantive due process grew out of a kind of early public
3. 6 Pick (23 Mass.) 187 (1828).
4. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon
the Legislative Power on the States of the American Union (Little, Brown, 1868}.
5. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420 (1837).

1994]

BOOK REVIEW

257

choice theory that was deeply suspicious of the regulatory process, inclined to see it as favoring special interests at the expense
of the public, and willing to use judtcial power to strike down the
resulting legislation even if there was no identifiable clause in the
Constitution that forbad the legislation at issue.
The effect of this interpretation is to make the Lochner era
look much more creative and constructive than reactionary.
Probably the most common explanation of Lochner other than
the "legal formalism" explanation is Holmes's explanation that it
was a reactionary period in which conservatives responded to socialism, the labor movement, and Progressive politics by ignoring
their concerns and aligning themselves with the propertied interests to which the new movements were opposed. However, the
movement began to take on a reactionary cast because the free
market principles that it professed were challenged by a Progressive regime whose confidence in the equanimity of the market
was very much in doubt. As Gillman puts it, the ideology of substantive due process was fairly inclusive, or egalitarian in the
early nineteenth century, but as the market increasingly produced maldistributions of wealth it became increasingly exclusive. In that sense, the "story of the Lochner era is a story about
judicial fidelity to crumbling foundations, not judicial infidelity to
recoverable foundations."
This is a readable book that will enlarge any reader's view of
the Lochner era, even those who know their constitutional history well. It makes clear that, for all that has been said of the
period, there are still worthwhile things to say.

THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC. By George W. Carey.1 Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1989. Pp. 181. $22.95.
Michael P. Zuckertz

George Carey has been publishing essays on The Federalist
at least since 1976, and therefore his recent book is rather like a
nicely aged wine or cheese. The comparison is apt, for the book
has the kind of delicacy and sureness of touch we associate with a
high quality burgundy: smooth and flavorful, without being assertive, sharp-edged, or flashy. In a word, Carey's is a mature study
from which all who are interested in The Federalist can learn
something.
1. Professor of Political Science, Georgetown University.
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